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Summary
This short paper reviews the recent anti-trust analysis of banking mergers as well as
recent decisions by the Department of Justice and the Bundeskartellamt (in the last few
months).  We analyse the proposed merger between UBS and SBC in light of this
evidence and focus on the domestic retail banking.   Three conclusions stand out :
- there is overwhelming evidence that the relevant market for some products is local.
In particular, the market for  loans to small and medium size enterprises should be
considered as a local market and this has consistently been the practice of both the US
and German authorities.
- barriers to entry in retail banking are significant so that high concentration should be
a source of concern.    This concern is reflected in recent decisions on bank mergers by
the Department of Justice.  By the standards of the US practice, the concentration
resulting from the UBS/SBC merger would be simply unacceptable and by a wide
margin.
-  divestiture is the most common remedy in banking and it seems to be effective.
Given the concentration entailed by the proposed merger, nothing less than a the  full
divestiture of one retail network seems adequate.3
Introduction
The impact that the proposed merger between UBS and SBS might have on
competition has been openly questioned in recent months.    In particular, it has been
argued that the UBS/SBC merger, like many mergers in banking,  might raise
important concerns with respect to competition in the market for loans to small and
medium size enterprises.    The Swiss Competition Commission has effectively
recognised that the proposed merger might pose a problem in terms of competition and
has accordingly decided in early February to undertake a deep investigation.  Its
concerns were so serious that it also decided to suspend the merger, at least with
respect to its domestic dimension.  Significantly, the Commission did not have to take
that step.  It could have proceeded with its deep investigation without taking such a
provisional measure.
The objective of this short paper is to review the arguments and the available empirical
evidence regarding the analysis of  banking mergers from the perspective of
competition and competition policy.    There is a rich evidence on the effect of banking
mergers on competition and ample experience on the anti-trust treatment of banking
mergers from other countries.  The US, in particular, has experienced an important
wave of mergers in banking in the last few years, following the extensive deregulation
of interstate banking.   The approach followed by the department of justice as well as
other jurisdictions with respect to these mergers provides interesting insights and offers
some important references against which the Swiss situation can be assessed.
A typical anti-trust analysis of mergers proceeds by first defining relevant markets both
in terms of products and in geographical scope. The level of concentration in the
relevant market is then computed and its potential effect on the exercise of market
power is evaluated, with particular reference to entry barriers.   To the extent that the
legal framework allows for it,  potential efficiency benefits associated with the merger
can then be assessed and traded-off against the negative consequences of the
concentration on market power.  This last step in the analysis is typically not
undertaken in the European Community, where the merger regulation does not allow4
for efficiency considerations to be weighted against market power.  In the case of
Switzerland, the law is also quite clear:  the prohibition is formulated solely in terms of
competition.  What matters is whether the effective competition will be suppressed.
The only redeeming feature would be associated with an increase of competition in a
different market from that in which the concentration has negative consequences in
terms of market power.   The final step in the analysis, if it is found that the
concentration would have unacceptable negative effects on competition, is to consider
remedies.   In the case of banking,  divestitures of  branches is a very  common and
effective remedy.
Our discussion will follow this approach.  Section 1 discusses the relevant market.
Section 2 considers the evaluation of dominance.  Section 3 considers possible
remedies.  Section 4 concludes.
1.  The relevant anti-trust markets
Before reviewing the evidence on the definition of relevant markets, it is worth
recalling some simple principles of market definition.  Indeed, some of the recent
discussion of relevant markets, in particular by Dr Volkart and Dr Watter (both
working for the UBS, 1998) is deeply confused on the issue.
1.1. Principles
The objective of this first step in the analysis is to identify markets in which the
merging firms operate and in which market power could potentially be exercised.  The
procedure to identify these relevant markets proceeds as follows
2 ;  pick a very narrow
product which is sold by the merging firms and wonder whether a firm which would
have a monopoly over this product would be able to exercise market power.  For
instance, consider the sale of an investment product by banks, say unit  trusts.  Would
a bank be able to exercise market power in the sale of this product if it had a monopoly
?  The answer is probably not - because customers will be able to buy shares directly as5
an alternative to the purchase of unit trusts.   If the answer is negative, the market is
enlarged to include further products, for instance all investment products.   With such a
market, the answer to the question of whether a monopolist would be able to exercise
market power  might be positive because customers might have little alternative for
placing their savings.    A monopoly banks might be able to increase its margins at the
expense of its customers.   Investment products will then be considered as a relevant
anti-trust market.
In general,  the evaluation of the relevant anti-trust market will thus hinge on whether
customers are able to switch their consumption easily and avoid purchasing a product
from the firm raising its price (this is often termed demand substitution) but also on the
extent to which competitors (outside the candidate market) will react by competing
more fiercely when the monopoly firm in the candidate market is trying to raise price
(this is often termed supply substitution ).   In the example above, supply substitution
would occur if  banks selling investment products, which are substitute for unit trust,
would react to an increase in the price of unit trust  by lowering their price on these
alternative instruments or would react by selling unit trusts themselves.   Typically,
relevant markets will also be defined both in terms of product range and in terms of
geographical scope.
It is worth emphasising that the concept of the relevant anti-trust market is very
different from the traditional concept of the (economic) market.  An economic market
will include all the products that are substitutes for one another.  A relevant anti-trust
market will include the narrowest  subset of the products such that a given degree of
market power could be exercised
3.   In geographical terms, the relevant anti-trust
market is thus not the market area in which the firms are present.  It is the narrowest
market in which serious consequences in terms of market power could occur if a firm
was completely dominant.   That is also to say however that the geographical market
coverage  of UBS/SBC for any particular product does not determine the relevant
geographic market.   The internal organisation of these firms in the provision of these
                                                                                                                                                              
2  There is a vast literature on the issue.  See for instance, the US Department of Justice (1992),
Fischwick and Denison (1992) or Froeb and Werden (1991).6
products is also entirely irrelevant to the matter.   Whether UBS or SBC  authorise
mortgage loans for the canton of Vaud from Lausanne, Bâle of Zurich is entirely
irrelevant to the question of whether market power could be exercised in the market
for mortgage loans in the canton of Vaud.
1.2.  The issue
Both the UBS and the SBC  provide many different banking services in the broad
categories of retail, private and investment banking and there is potentially a large
number of relevant anti-trust market to identify.    However,  it appears that the
analysis is straightforward for a large number of them;  in particular, it seems that the
relevant geographic market for private and investment banking services is much larger
than Switzerland. Since the combined market share of  UBS and SBC in those relevant
market is presumably small,  the potential risk of market power is probably negligible.
There may be exceptions however.  For instance,  the three large private banks
undertake most of the dealing in securities on behalf of the Swiss National Bank for its
open market operations.  This market is closed to foreign competitors because of the
prevailing statutory regime.   As a result, the market for the operations on behalf of the
Swiss National Bank is probably a national market and the merger would lead to
substantial increase in concentration.  The adequate remedy in this case is, however,
straightforward.  What is required is a change in the statutory regime such that foreign
banks are allowed to compete.
Retail banking is another matter.   A number of questions arise ;  for instance, should
the market for households be desegregated into different components like payment
services, savings account,  checks and personal loans or should these services
considered as a bundle ?  Should the market for loans to enterprises be split into
several segments ?  What is the geographical scope of the market for loans to
enterprises ?  of the market for investment services to households ?  A precise answer
to these questions in principle requires a great deal of analysis.  The importance of
demand and supply substitution has to be assessed in each case.  Fortunately, however,
                                                                                                                                                              
3 In the US, the amount of market power which could be exercised is further specified.  It is the ability7
there is a rich body of anti-trust analysis undertaken in other jurisdictions which has
direct relevance for the Swiss case.
1.3.  The Evidence
Two hard facts emerge from this evidence:  First,  with respect to enterprises, the
relevant market is usually taken as a bundle of services including loans and depository
services, the market for small and medium size firms is taken as different from that to
large firms and the market to small and medium size firms  is considered as local.  The
approach of the department of justice in the US  is systematic in this instance (see box
1).  It is based on very detailed evidence arising from the Survey of small business
finance (the type of evidence which is considered as most appropriate to assess market
definition).  For instance, it is found that an overwhelming majority of small and
medium enterprise (93 % ) do obtain these services from banks which are located
within a distance of less than 30 miles from their own location (see Kwast et al., 1997).
When small businesses are asked about the factors influencing the choice of a bank,
location also appears as the primary factor (see Kwast and all, 1997).  Accordingly, the
unit of analysis which is adopted by the Department of Justice for the analysis of
mergers is the Metropolitan Area.  These areas are typically  smaller than a medium-
sized Swiss canton.
The approach of the Department of Justice is also similar to that adopted by the
Bundeskartelamt in the recent merger between the Bayrische Vereinsbank and
Hypobank in Bavaria (see Box 2).  Specifically, the Commission has investigated
concentration in the following towns in Bavaria: Kempten, Augsburg, Rosenheim,
München, Regensburg, Nürnberg, Bayreuth, Schweinsfurt and Hof.  Some of
these towns are very small indeed and certainly smaller than  most Swiss cantons.
                                                                                                                                                              
to profitably raise price by 5 % above the competitive level (US Dpt of Justice, 1992).8
Box 1.  US antitrust authorities on relevant markets
According to A. Bingaman (Deputy Attorney General of the Department of Justice),
on loans to small and medium size enterprise (Bingaman, 1996):
« In a number of cases and policy statements, the Department has indicated that these
banking services are most likely to raise competitive concerns in mergers of major
banking organisations located in the same metropolitan area or town, because the
providers of these services tend to be only other commercial banks or depository
institutions...
The Department also examines the geographic market for these loans; only depository
institutions located in the same general area as the merging banks are generally found
to be competitors of the merging banks by the Department.  This implies that the
Department has found the relevant geographic markets for these specific products  are
generally local in nature »...(p. 306...308)
According to Rhoades (from the Federal Reserve, also in charge of vetting bank
mergers) : "Evidence indicates that local market areas are generally the appropriate
focus for analysis of the competitive effects of bank mergers. In particular, surveys of
both households and small businesses point strongly toward the relevance of local
geographic areas. (p. 344)
That the relevant market for loans to small and medium size businesses should be local
also accords very much with intuition.  The very essence of retail banking activities
towards small businesses is the build up and maintenance of a relationship with the
entrepreneurs from which the bank can obtain privileged information about their
creditworthiness.  Such relationship banking requires close and repeated contacts
which only take place if the banker and its client are located close to each other.   In
addition to its  relationship with the entrepreneur,  local bankers will also obtain useful
information about their client by directly observing its behaviour as well as market9
conditions and by local networking.   All of this certainly explains why relationship
banking with small and medium size enterprises is local in nature.
Box 2. The Bunderkartellamt on relevant markets
« One obtains a differentiated picture of the market position of the companies, when
one looks at the individual relevant markets. One has to distinguish between those
activities which are tied to branch offices, and where the relevant market is typically a
regional market and those markets which are not dependent on branch offices, and for
which the geographic market is primarily the national market.
On the relevant markets of those activities which are tied to branch offices (typically
current account- and short and medium term credit on the one hand, and sight-,
savings and short and medium term deposits on the other hand) the banks will not
achieve joint market shares which are critical from the point of view of competition
policy, if considered at the national level. However, they have a much larger market
share in the private customer and firm market in Bavaria. But even on the regional
markets in Bavaria they achieve market shares of only 10-20%,  in every case much
less than 30%. » (WuW 1997/11 P. 882-3, own translation)
Second, with respect to household services, the US  practice also tends to define the
relevant market as the market for a bundle of services and to consider local markets.
The Department of Justice uses deposits as a good proxy for the value of the bundle of
household services (mostly for lack of data on the bundle).     The empirical evidence
in support of this approach is, however, less overwhelming than in the case of loans to
small and medium size enterprises.  In particular, the survey of household finance
suggest that credit services could be less local than asset related services like checking
accounts and payment facilities.  For instance,  credit card services are typically not
purchased from local institutions.  A significant proportion of customers also obtain
credit for car purchases and mortgages from banks located more than 50 miles away.10
Such a pattern is also observed for some asset related services like brokerage and the
purchase of unit trusts.
Despite the fact that some services may not be tied to local branches, the Department
of Justice still considers household services as local, because checking and savings
accounts are overwhelmingly local.   This policy has been questioned on the grounds
that services associated with checking accounts are also increasingly dissociated from
the local networks because of so called « electronic banking ».   This broad term is
meant to include the provision of cash services through automated teller machines, the
operation of transfers from digital telephones and televisions or the completion of
simple operations like transfers or purchase/sales of equities from a personal computer.
In terms of principles, it seems that electronic banking would indeed tend to enlarge
the geographic scope of the relevant market (even though electronic banking also
raises switching costs - because the cost of changing transfer specification for creditors
might increase - see Rhoades (1997, p 1007)).    The question is, however, whether it
is sufficiently widespread to affect market definition in practice (or whether the threat
of widespread use is credible).  The evidence in this regard is sobering.  Indeed, in the
US which is arguably the market where PC penetration is highest, less than 1 % of
financial transaction take place via home banking according to a recent study by Ernst
and Young  (as quoted by Mitchell, 1996).    According to Rhoades (1996) from the
Federal Reserve Board, « despite the current availability of the great potential for
electronic banking, it has a long way to go before it has a significant influence on the
competitive effects of bank mergers ».
Interestingly, Dr Volkart, working for the UBS, claims (Volkart, 1998) that electronic
banking is so important that it will transform not only the provision of banking services
to households but also to small and medium enterprises to such an extent that these
markets are no longer regional but at least national.   These claims are thus completely
at odds with existing anti-trust analysis and practice of both US and German
authorities.  In particular, the claim relating to the provision of loans to enterprises
through computer networks has never  been seriously discussed in the US.
1.4. Conclusion11
To conclude, there is overwhelming evidence that the relevant market for loans to
small and medium size enterprise should be considered as a local market and this is the
practice of both the US and German authorities.    There is thus a strong presumption
that the relevant market for these services should the canton and not the whole
country.  The UBS is claiming that the market is national.    The practice of
experienced competition authorities is however compelling and accordingly, the burden
of proof is firmly set on the Competition Commission.  If it were to decide to ignore
the existing evidence and follow the suggestion of UBS by considering that the
relevant market is national, it should provide strong empirical evidence in support of
this approach.
 2. The analysis of dominance
Having defined the relevant market properly, the competition authorities can be
confident that they have identified those markets where something serious could
happen in terms of market power (i.e. such that a monopolist could exercise an
unacceptable degree of market power).  The question then becomes whether after the
proposed merger the market would become so concentrated that market power would
indeed be exercised.  To assess this matter, antitrust authorities first compute what is
the concentration in the market and what it would be if the merger took place.
Various measures can be used for this purpose.  If the  merger leads to a high level of
concentration and/or a high increase in concentration,  there is a first presumption that
the merger might be unacceptable.   Still, because high concentration does not
necessarily lead to market power when entry is easy,  the authorities usually evaluate
the importance of entry barriers.  If high concentration is combined with significant
barriers to entry, the merger is deemed unacceptable.  If barriers to entry are very
small, it may be acceptable despite high concentration.   We review both steps of the
analysis in turn.12
 2.1 Concentration
In the US, competition authorities tend to use the Herfindahl index of concentration,
whereas the EU tends to give more weight to market shares.  The difference between
the two approaches stems from a different legal standards towards dominance.  In the
US, it is widely accepted that firms can collectively dominate the market.  That is, in
order to assess the potential for exercise of market power, the market shares of all
firms present in the market do matter.   The underlying presumption is that a merger
which occurs in industry which is already concentrated is inherently more dangerous
than a merger arising in an industry where there are many small and medium size firms.
This presumption derives from the observation that collusion is much easier in
concentrated markets.  Accordingly, there is a high risk that a merger in a concentrated
industry will lead to co-ordinated behaviour between the firms so that all firms
(collectively) exercise market power.   The EU legal standard is less clear about
collective dominance (even though the concept of collective dominance has been used
explicitly in cases like Nestlé-Perrier and Kali und Salz).  Accordingly, the EU gives
more weight to market shares.
The Swiss standard is quite clear on the matter.  Art 4 of the law explicitly refers to the
possibility that several firms might jointly dominate the market.  Accordingly, the
market share of  non-merging firms is important for the analysis of dominance and the
Herfindahl index is a priori a sensible measure for that purpose.
The US merger guidelines provide three benchmarks to assess concentration as
measured by the Herfindahl (HHI) index.  First, where the post merger HHI index is
below 1’000, the merger will « ordinarily » be approved.  Secondly, a post merger
HHI between 1’000 and 1’800 means that the market is moderately concentrated.
Within this region, an increase in the HHI of less than 100 points is a sufficient
condition for the merger to be approved, whilst one of more then 100 points raises
« significant competitive concerns ».  Thirdly a post merger HHI greater than 1’800
means that the market is « highly concentrated ».  Within this region, an increase in
HHI of less than 50 points is a sufficient condition for the merger to be approved.  One13
of more than 50 points raises significant competitive concerns and one more than 100
points is « likely to create or enhance market power ».
In the case of banking mergers, the department of justice has slightly modified the
benchmarks by allowing mergers within the intermediate category as long as they do
not increase the HHI by more than 200 points (rather than 100 in the merger
guidelines, see Bingaman, (1996),  on this issue).
Table 1  Combined market shares (%) of UBS/SBC - loan market (above 100 000 SF)
Argovie 36 Nidwald 44
Appenzell - Ext 90 Obwald 20
Appenzell - Int 25 Schaffouse 36
Bâle Campagne 38 Schwyz 22
Bâle Ville 54 Solothurm 59
Berne 42 St Gallen 50
Fribourg 22 Tessin 36
Genève 38 Thurgovie 42
Glaris 28 Uri 39
Grisons 35 Vaud 22
Jura 22 Valais 49
Lucerne 30 Zug 25
Neuchatel 22 Zurich 38
There are no official guidelines in Switzerland.  It is nonetheless useful to asses the
concentration that would result from the UBS merger relative to the US benchmarks.
Precise calculation is difficult because the market shares of all banks are considered as
confidential by the banking commission and hence are not made available to the public.
The market shares of UBS/SBC in the market for small and medium size enterprise
loans have however been made public and some rough estimates of concentration can
be computed.  Table 1reports the combined market shares of UBS/SBC for loans
(above 100’000 SF).    It is striking that these markets are already very high and in
eight cantons would by themselves bring the HHI above the 1’800 benchmark !   It is
also found however that in those cantons where the merged entity would have a lower
market share, there is another large player (typically a cantonal bank). It appears that in14
almost all cantons, three firms (the merged entity, Crédit Suisse and a cantonal bank)
would after the merger have a combined market share of 90 %.  Assuming that the
distribution is typically such that one firm would have 40 % and the remaining two
about 25 %, the resulting HHI should be at least 3 000 !  and in all cases the increase
in the HHI resulting from the merger would be much above 200.  This estimate clearly
illustrates that the proposed merger would be considered as highly suspect in the US.
It would involve concentration levels substantially above the benchmark which a
market is considered a « highly concentrated ».
2.2.  Barriers to entry
There are several ways in which barriers to entry can be assessed. First, one can
wonder about potential obstacles in terms of principles. Second, one can infer the
stance of other anti-trust authorities towards barriers to entry by checking whether
these authorities have allowed mergers despite high levels of concentration.  The US
evidence will be particularly useful in this regard.     Finally, one can verify ex post
whether barriers to entry are large to the extent that in the absence of barriers there
should be no observed relationship between concentration and market power.
In terms of principle, one would expect entry to be difficult in particular in the market
for loans to small and medium size enterprises.  The relationship between the
entrepreneur and the bank which underlies the credit market  is not one that can be
created overnight.   The establishment of mutual trust requires experimentation, which
naturally takes time.  Accordingly,  one cannot expect that entry into the market for
loans through the establishment of a branch network will be fast.   It will take a long
time before entrants can credibly establish themselves.    The investment that the
entrepreneur and the banker undertake in building their  relations is also largely sunk.
For the entrepreneur, this implies that the will face important switching cost ex post
and accordingly the entry of new banks will be made more difficult.  The existence of
these costs also allows the incumbent firms to establish strategic barriers to entry.  For
instance, established banks can sign exclusive contracts with firms and retailers.  they
can pre-empt entry by over-extending their branch networks or by capturing the most
favourable locations.15
These switching costs and associated strategic entry barriers have been investigated in
a number of studies and summarised in Rhoades (1997).  He finds strong evidence that
entry barriers are significant and the incumbent firms benefit from important first
mover advantage
4.
In terms of the implicit attitude of antitrust authorities towards barriers to entry, the
evidence is also compelling.   Table 2 presents the seven most recent bank mergers that
have been approved by the Federal Reserve Board and the department of Justice in
which divestitures were made.  Several observations can be made.  First, it is clear that
the relevant markets were local.  Indeed the areas (counties or cities) concerned by
divestitures have almost always less than 100’000 habitants and hence are considerably
smaller than a typical  Swiss canton.   Second,  divestitures have be imposed to such an
extent that whenever possible the ex post HHI has been kept below 2’300 (there are
only 5 cities where HHI above 2’300 have been allowed and where further divestiture
would have been possible out of a total of 22 cases where less than maximum
divestitures have been imposed).    Third,  maximum divestiture (which implies the sale
of the branches of one of the merging partner and hence no increase in the HHI) has
been imposed even in case where the concentration was only moderately above 1’800.
Finally, in all (but three) cases where a concentration above 2’600 remains after the
remedies, maximum divestitures have been imposed.
Overall, this evidence indicates that whenever possible the US authorities have tried to
keep concentration to a low level.  Such an approach can only be associated with the
view that barriers to entry are significant so that that concentration is indeed a matter
of serious concern.
The final piece of evidence regarding barriers to entry concerns the relation between
concentration, market power and profit.  A positive relation is clearly observed across
EC countries between concentration and returns (see figure 1, borrowed from a study
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costs hare high (Sharpe, 1997).  It is also found that deposit rates adjust less quickly to market
conditions when concentration is high (Jackson, 1997).16
by Morgan Stanley).   Such a relationship has also been found in a number of studies of
local market (summarised in Rhoades, 1996).   For instance,  Hannan (1991) found
that «small borrowers would pay annually an additional 50 basis points for floating rate
unsecured loans, 159 more basis points for floating rate secured loans and an
additional 144 basis points for fixed rate secured loans if the market structure were to
change from that of the least concentrated to that of the most concentrated market in
the sample ».      Cases studies of mergers in banking also confirm that concentration
yields higher margins and profits:  for instance, Prager and Hannan (1998) found that
in markets where mergers had taken place, deposit rates that banks offer to their
customers had fallen significantly faster over the period 91-94 than deposit rates in
markets where no merger had occurred.
Overall,  there is a strong evidence that barriers to entry in retail banking are very
significant.   The claim of Dr Watter, who works for UBS, that they are negligible is
hard to square with the facts.
 2.3 Conclusion
There is no doubt that the merger between UBS and SBC would lead to a substantial
level of concentration in cantonal markets, which are the relevant anti-trust markets for
products like loans to small and  medium size enterprises.   By the benchmark of recent
anti-trust decisions in the US, such levels of concentration would be simply
unacceptable.  Concentration is seen as a serious concern  in these markets because
entry barriers are significant.   There is little doubt given recent cases that such
concentration would also be considered unlawful in Germany.    The attitude of the
UK authorities towards the proposed merger between Lloyds and Midlands in the early
nineties is also suggestive:  The merger was referred to the MMC and eventually fell
through before a ruling made.  Yet, Sir Gordon Borrie, in charge of the OFT, made it
very clear that mergers between such large banks would be closely scrutinised
5.  The
                                                       
5 Sir Gordon said while referring to the proposed merger,  «We have been keeping a wary eye on
banks, especially when one of the majors seeks to take over another one of the majors ».  He added
that the « was concerned that banks were overcharging small businesses, which unlike individual
consumers, could not go to building societies instead » - Reuters, 3.6.92. 17
financial press at the time also speculated that the merger did not occur partly because
the parties anticipated difficulties with the MMC.
Concentration should also be taken particularly seriously in Switzerland because of the
history of explicit cartels between banks.   Whether such explicit co-ordination was
partly lawful (under the old regime) or not is irrelevant.  What matters is that co-
ordination is unlawful under the current law and that a history of close interactions
certainly facilitates the co-ordination of behaviour
6.
3.  Remedies
Several types of remedies can be contemplated if a merger is found unacceptable.
Antitrust authorities usually have a strong preference for so called structural remedies,
which directly affect the level of concentration, by comparison with behavioural
remedies (whereby firms commit to a particular behaviour).  In turn, the most common
form of structural remedy is a divestiture, whereby the merging parties sell part of their
business to an independent third party.   In terms of competition, this is by far the best
solution:  the acquirer should preferably be a completely new entrant who is unlikely to
be accustomed to long habits of co-ordination and accordingly most likely to provide
renewed competitive pressure.  Divestitures have also found to be quite effective in ex
post studies of remedies; according to an internal study of the Federal Reserve Board,
branches or networks that been divested in US mergers seem to flourish and to act as a
strong pro-competitive force.
As indicated above, divestitures are very common in the US.  Even complete
divestitures, such that one local network is sold to a third party have been routinely
imposed (see table 2 in the appendix).   In the case of Switzerland,  the level of
concentration entailed by the merger is so large that nothing less than a divestiture of a
full network seems adequate.
4. Conclusion18
In our view the case for imposing drastic remedies on UBS/SBC merger with respect
to retail banking is overwhelming, at least on the basis of recent anti-trust analysis and
the practice of experienced anti-trust authorities.
By contrast, the UBS through Dr Volkart and/or Dr Watter (1998)  takes very
adventurous and speculative positions.  Against the current practice of experienced
anti-trust authorities, they claim that the relevant market for all products is at least
national.  Against recent experience and conventional wisdom, they speculate that
electronic banking will make branches unnecessary even for products like loans to
small and medium size enterprises.    Against all evidence,  they also claim that entry
barriers in retail banking are low.
The Competition authority might decide to follow the line of arguments suggested by
merging parties.  Given the strong presumption against these arguments which arises
from current anti-trust practice abroad, solid evidence in support of its position will be
required to convince the general public and the anti-trust community.
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